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Abstract
We define the independent natural extension of two local models for the general case of infi-
nite spaces, using both sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions. In contrast
to Miranda and Zaffalon (2015), we adopt Williams-coherence instead of Walley-coherence. We
show that our notion of independent natural extension always exists—whereas theirs does not—and
that it satisfies various convenient properties, including factorisation and external additivity.
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1. Introduction
When probabilities are imprecise, in the sense that they are only partially specified, it is no longer
clear what it means for two variables to be independent (Couso et al., 1999). One approach is to
apply the standard notion of independence to every element of some set of probability measures.
The alternative, called epistemic independence, is to define independence as mutual irrelevance, in
the sense that receiving information about one of the variables will not effect our uncertainty model
for the other. The advantage of this intuitive alternative is that it has a much wider scope: since
epistemic independence is expressed in terms of uncertainty models instead of probabilities, it can
easily be applied to a variety of such models, including non-probabilistic ones; we here consider
sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions.
When an assessment of epistemic independence is combined with local uncertainty models,
it leads to a unique corresponding joint uncertainty model that is called the independent natural
extension. If the variables involved can take only a finite number of values, this independent natural
extension always exists, and it then satisfies various convenient properties that allow for the design
of efficient algorithms (de Cooman et al., 2011; de Cooman and Miranda, 2012). If the variables
involved take values in an infinite set, the situation becomes more complicated. On the one hand,
for the specific case of lower probabilities, Vicig (2000) managed to obtain results that resemble the
finite case. On the other hand, for the more general case of lower previsions, Miranda and Zaffalon
(2015) recently found that the independent natural extension may not even exist.
Our present contribution generalises the results of Vicig (2000) to the case of conditional lower
previsions, using sets of desirable gambles as an intermediate step. The key technical difference
with Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) is that we use Williams-coherence instead of Walley-coherence.
This difference turns out to be crucial because our notion of independent natural extension always
exists. Furthermore, as we will see, it satisfies the same convenient properties that are known to
hold in the finite case, including factorisation and external additivity.
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2. Preliminaries and Notation
We use N to denote the natural numbers without zero and let N0 := N∪{0}. R is the set of real
numbers and Q is the set of rational numbers. Sign restrictions are imposed with subscripts. For
example, we let R>0 be the set of positive real numbers and let Q≥0 be the set of non-negative
rational numbers. The extended real numbers are denoted by R := R∪{−∞,+∞}.
For any non-empty set X , the power set of X —the set of all subsets of X —is denoted by
P(X ), and we let P /0(X ) := P(X ) \ { /0} be the set of all non-empty subsets of X . Elements
of P(X ) are called events. A set of events B ⊆ P(X ) is called a field if it is non-empty and
closed with respect to complements and finite intersections and unions. If it is also closed with
respect to countable intersections and unions, it is called a sigma field. A partition of X is a set
B ⊆ P /0(X ) of pairwise disjoint non-empty subsets of X whose union is equal to X . We also
adopt the notational trick of identifying X with the set of atoms {{x} : x ∈X }, which allows us
to regard X as a partition of X .
A bounded real-valued function on X will be called a gamble on X . The set of all gambles
on X is denoted by G (X ), the set of all non-negative gambles on X is denoted by G≥0(X ), and
we let G>0(X ) := G≥0(X ) \ {0} be the set of all non-negative non-zero gambles. For any set of
gambles A ⊆ G (X ), we let
posi(A ) :=
{
n
∑
i=1
λi fi : n ∈ N,λi ∈ R>0, fi ∈A
}
(1)
and
E (A ) := posi (A ∪G>0(X )) . (2)
Indicators are a particular type of gamble. For any A ∈P(X ), the corresponding indicator IA of A
is a gamble in G (X ), defined for all x ∈X by IA(x) := 1 if x ∈ A and IA(x) := 0 otherwise.
Finally, for any B ⊆P /0(X ), we will also require the notion of a non-negative B-measurable
gamble, which we define as a uniform limit of simple B-measurable gambles.
Definition 1 Let B ⊆ P /0(X ). We call g ∈ G≥0(X ) a simple B-measurable gamble if there are
c0 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ci ∈ R≥0 and Bi ∈B, such that g= c0+∑
n
i=1 ciIBi .
Definition 2 Let B ⊆P /0(X ). A gamble g ∈ G≥0(X ) is B-measurable if it is a uniform limit of
non-negative simple B-measurable gambles, in the sense that there is a sequence {gn}n∈N of simple
B-measurable gambles in G≥0(X ) such that limn→+∞ sup |g−gn|= 0.
Readers that are familiar with the concepts of simple and measurable functions that are com-
mon in measure theory will observe some similarities. However, there are also some important
differences. On the one hand, our definitions are more restrictive: we only consider bounded non-
negative functions, Definition 1 requires that the coefficients ci are non-negative, and Definition 2
considers uniform limits instead of pointwise limits. On the other hand, our definitions are more
general because we allow for B to be any subset of P /0(X ). Nevertheless, if B∪{ /0} is a sigma
field, we have the following equivalence.
Proposition 3 Consider any B ⊆P /0(X ) such that B
∗ := B∪{ /0} is a sigma field. Then for any
g ∈ G≥0(X ), g is B
∗-measurable in the measure-theoretic sense (Nielsen, 1997, Definition 10.1) if
and only if it is B-measurable in the sense of Definition 2.
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The proof of this result is based on the following sufficient condition forB-measurability, which
provides a convenient tool for establishing the B-measurability of a given function. In particular, it
implies that every non-negative gamble is P /0(X )-measurable.
Proposition 4 Let B ⊆P /0(X ) and g ∈ G≥0(X ). If, for all r ∈ Q≥0, the set {x ∈X : g(x) ≥ r}
is a finite union of pairwise disjoint events in B∪{X , /0}, then g is B-measurable.
Corollary 5 Every g ∈ G≥0(X ) is P /0(X )-measurable.
3. Modelling Uncertainty
A subject’s uncertainty about a variable X that takes values x in some non-empty set X can be
mathematically represented in various ways. The most popular such method is perhaps probability
theory, but it is by no means the only one, nor is it the most general one. In order for our results to
have a broader scope, we here adopt the frameworks of sets of desirable gambles and conditional
lower previsions.
The main aim of this section is to provide an overview of the basic technical aspects of these
frameworks, as these will be essential to the rest of the paper. Notably, we do not impose any
constraints on the cardinality of X : it may be finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite.
Connections with other—perhaps better known—models for uncertainty, including probability the-
ory, will be discussed briefly at the end.
The basic idea behind sets of desirable gambles is to model a subject’s uncertainty about X by
considering his attitude towards gambles—bets—on X . In particular, we consider the gambles
f ∈ G (X ) that he finds desirable, in the sense that he is willing to engage in a transaction where,
once the actual value x ∈X of X is known, he will receive a—possibly negative—reward f (x) in
some linear utility scale. Even more so, he prefers these desirable gambles over the status quo, that
is, over not conducting any transaction at all. A set of desirable gambles is called coherent if it
satisfies the following rationality requirements.
Definition 6 A coherent set of desirable gambles D on X is a subset of G (X ) such that, for any
two gambles f ,g ∈ G (X ) and any non-negative real number λ ∈ R>0:
D1: if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0, then f ∈D;
D2: if f ∈D then λ f ∈D;
D3: if f ,g ∈D , then f +g ∈D;
D4: if f ≤ 0, then f /∈D .
Despite their simplicity, sets of desirable gambles offer a surprisingly powerful framework for mod-
elling uncertainty; see for example (Walley, 2000) and (Quaeghebeur, 2014). For our present pur-
poses though, all we need for now is Definition 6.
Conditional lower previsions also model a subject’s uncertainty about X by considering his
attitude towards gambles on X . However, in this case, instead of considering sets of gambles, we
consider the prices at which a subject is willing to buy these gambles. Let
C (X ) := G (X )×P /0(X )
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be the set of all pairs ( f ,B), where f is a gamble on X and B is a non-empty subset of X —an
event. A conditional lower prevision is then defined as follows.
Definition 7 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a map
P : C → R : ( f ,B)→ P( f |B).
For any ( f ,B) in the domain C , the lower prevision P( f |B) of f conditional on B is interpreted as
a subject’s supremum price µ for buying f , under the condition that the transaction is called off
when B does not happen—if x /∈ B. In other words, P( f |B) is the supremum value of µ for which
he is willing to engage in a transaction where he receives f (x)−µ if x ∈ B and zero otherwise, and
furthermore prefers this transaction to the status quo.
It is also possible to consider conditional upper previsions P( f |B), which are interpreted as
infimum selling prices. However, since selling f for µ is equivalent to buying − f for −µ , we have
that P( f |B) = −P(− f |B). For that reason, we will mainly focus on conditional lower previsions.
Unconditional lower previsions correspond to the special case where B= X for all ( f ,B) ∈ C ; we
then use the shorthand notation P( f ) := P( f |X ) and call P( f ) the lower prevision of f . Similarly,
we refer to P( f ) := P( f |X ) as the upper prevision of f .
Because of their interpretation in terms of buying prices for gambles, a particularly intuitive
way to obtain a conditional lower prevision P is to derive it from a set of gambles D . In particular,
for every D ⊆ G (X ), we let
PD ( f |B) := sup{µ ∈R : [ f −µ ]IB ∈D} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (3)
A conditional lower prevision is then called coherent if can be derived from a coherent set of desir-
able gambles in this way.
Definition 8 A conditional lower prevision P on a domain C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if there is a
coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that P coincides with PD on C .
This definition of coherence is heavily inspired by the work of Williams (1975, 2007). The
only two minor differences are that our rationality axioms on D are slightly different from his, and
that we do not impose any structure on the domain C . Nevertheless, when the domain C satisfies
the structural constraints in (Williams, 2007), Definition 8 is equivalent to that of Williams. More
generally, as the following result establishes, it is equivalent to the structure-free notion of Williams-
coherence that was developed by Pelessoni and Vicig (2009).
Proposition 9 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if and only if it is real-
valued and, for all n ∈ N0 and all choices of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C :
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ 0, (4)
where we let B := ∪ni=0Bi.
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The advantage of this alternative characterisation is that it is expressed directly in terms of lower
previsions. Nevertheless, we consider Equation (4) to be less intuitive than Definition 8, which is
why we prefer the latter.
From a mathematical point of view, Definition 8 also has the advantage that it allows for simple
and elegant proofs of some well-known results. For example, it follows trivially from our definition
of coherence that the domain of a coherent conditional lower prevision can be arbitrarily extended
while preserving coherence, whereas deriving this result directly from Equation 4 is substantially
more involved; see for example the proof of (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009, Proposition 1). Further-
more, our definition also allows for a very natural derivation of the so-called natural extension of
P, that is, the most conservative extension of P to C (X ). In particular, instead of having to derive
this natural extension directly, Definition 8 allows us to rephrase this problem into a closely related
yet simpler question: what is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that PD
coincides with P on C ? The answer turns out to be surprisingly simple.
Proposition 10 Consider a coherent conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) and let
AP :=
{
[ f −µ ]IB : ( f ,B) ∈ C ,µ < P( f |B)
}
and E (P) := E (AP). (5)
Then E (P) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X and PE (P) coincides with P on C . Further-
more, for any other coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that PD coincides with P on
C , we have that E (P)⊆D .
Abstracting away some technical details, the reason why this result holds should be intuitively
clear. First, since conditional lower previsions are interpreted as called-off supremum buying prices,
we see that the gambles in AP should be desirable. Combined with D1–D3, the desirability of the
gambles in E (P) then follows.
Since smaller sets of desirable gambles lead to more conservative—pointwise smaller—lower
previsions, we conclude that the natural extension of P is given by
E( f |B) := PE (P)( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (6)
The following proposition provides a formal statement of this result.
Proposition 11 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆C (X ). Then E, as defined
by Equation (6), is the pointwise smallest coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X ) that
coincides with P on C .
All in all, we conclude that Definition 8 provides an intuitive as well as mathematically con-
venient characterisation of Williams-coherence that is furthermore equivalent to the structure-free
version of Pelessoni and Vicig (2009). From a technical point of view, this equivalence will not be
important further on, since all of our arguments will be based on the connection with sets of desirable
gambles. From a practical point of view though, this equivalence is highly important, because the
Williams-coherent conditional lower previsions that are considered in (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009)
are well-known to include as special cases a variety of other uncertainty models, including expecta-
tions, lower expectations, probabilities, lower probabilities and belief functions; lower probabilities,
for example, can be obtained by restricting the domain of P to indicators. For that reason, all of
our results can be immediately applied to these special cases as well. A detailed treatment of these
special cases, however, does not fit within the page constraints of this contribution, and therefore
falls beyond the scope our present work.
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4. Epistemic Independence
Having introduced our main tools for modelling uncertainty, the next step towards developing a
notion of independent natural extension is to agree on what we mean by independence. Within the
context of lower previsions, there are basically two main options.
The first approach, which we will not consider here, is to interpret lower previsions as lower
expectations, that is, as tight lower bounds on the expectations that correspond to some set of prob-
ability measures, and to then impose the usual notion of independence on each of the probability
measures in that set. This approach has the advantage of being familiar, but is restricted in scope
because it can only be applied to uncertainty models that are expressed in terms of probabilities.
The second approach, which is the one that we will adopt here, is to regard independence as
an assessment of mutual irrelevance. In particular, we say that X1 and X2 are independent if our
uncertainty model for X1 is not affected by conditioning on information about X2, and vice versa.
This definition can easily be applied to a probability measure, and then yields the usual notion of
independence. However, and that is what makes this approach powerful and intuitive, it can just
as easily be applied to lower previsions, sets of desirable gambles, or any other type of uncertainty
model. This type of independence is usually referred to as epistemic independence. The aim of
this section is to formalize this concept for the case of two variables, in terms of sets of desirable
gambles and conditional lower previsions.
Consider two variables X1 and X2 where, for every i ∈ {1,2}, Xi takes values xi in a non-empty
set Xi that may be uncountably infinite, and let X := (X1,X2) be the corresponding joint variable
that takes values x := (x1,x2) in X1×X2. In this context, whenever convenient, we will identify
B ∈ P /0(X1) with B×X2 and B ∈ P /0(X2) with X1×B. Similarly, for any i ∈ {1,2}, we will
identify f ∈ G (Xi) with its cylindrical extension to G (X1×X2), defined by
f (x1,x2) := f (xi) for all x= (x1,x2) ∈X1×X2.
In order to make this explicit, we will then often denote this cylindrical extension by f (Xi). In this
way, for example, for any f ∈ G (X2) and B∈P(X1), we can write f (X2)IB(X1) to denote a gamble
in G (X1×X2)whose value in (x1,x2) is equal to f (x2) if x1 ∈B and equal to zero otherwise. Using
these conventions, for any set of gambles D on X1×X2, we define the marginal models
marg1(D) := { f ∈ G (X1) : f (X1) ∈D} and marg2(D) := { f ∈ G (X2) : f (X2) ∈D}
and, for any events B1 ∈P /0(X1) and B2 ∈P /0(X2), the conditional models
marg1(D⌋B2) := { f ∈ G (X1) : f (X1)IB2(X2) ∈D}
and
marg2(D⌋B1) := { f ∈ G (X2) : f (X2)IB1(X1) ∈D}.
Conditioning and marginalisation both preserve coherence: if D is a coherent set of desirable gam-
bles on X1×X2, then marg1(D) and marg1(D⌋B2) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on X1,
and marg2(D) and marg2(D⌋B1) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on X2.
That being said, let us now recall our informal definition of epistemic independence, which was
that the uncertainty model for X1 is not affected by conditioning on information about X2, and vice
versa. In the context of sets of desirable gambles, this can now be formalized as follows:
marg1(D |B2) =marg1(D) and marg2(D |B1) =marg2(D).
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The only thing that is left to specify are the conditioning events B1 and B2 for which we want this
condition to hold. We think that the most intuitive approach is to impose this for every B1 ∈P /0(X1)
and B2 ∈ P /0(X2), and will call this epistemic subset-independence. However, this is not what is
usually done. The conventional approach, which we will refer to as epistemic value-independence,
is to focus on singleton events of the type B1 = {x1} and B2 = {x2}; see for example (Walley, 1991)
and (de Cooman and Miranda, 2012). We believe this conventional approach to be flawed and will
argue against it further on. Until then, we postpone this debate by adopting a very general approach
that subsumes the former two as special cases. In particular, for every i ∈ {1,2}, we simply fix
a generic set of conditioning events Bi ⊆ P /0(Xi). Epistemic value-independence corresponds to
choosing Bi =Xi, whereas epistemic subset-independence corresponds to choosing Bi =P /0(Xi).
For sets of desirable gambles, this leads us to the following definition.
Definition 12 Let D be a coherent set of desirable gambles on X1×X2. Then D is epistemically
independent if, for any i and j such that {i, j} = {1,2}:
margi(D⌋B j) =margi(D) for all B j ∈B j.
For coherent lower previsions, as a prerequisite for defining epistemic independence, we require
that the domain C ⊆ C (X1×X2) is independent, by which we mean that for any i and j such that
{i, j} = {1,2}, any pair ( fi,Bi) ∈ C (Xi) and any event B j ∈B j:
( fi,Bi) ∈ C ⇔ ( fi,Bi∩B j) ∈ C . (7)
Other than that, we impose no restrictions on C ; its elements ( f ,B) ∈ C are for example not re-
stricted to the types that appear in Equation (7). As a result, the following definition of epistemic
independence is applicable beyond the context of lower previsions. For example, by restricting the
domain to indicators, we obtain a notion of epistemic independence that applies to conditional lower
probabilities. A detailed discussion of these special cases, however, is left as future work.
Definition 13 Let C ⊆ C (X1×X2) be an independent domain. A coherent conditional lower
prevision P on C is then epistemically independent if, for any i and j such that {i, j} = {1,2}:
P( fi|Bi) = P( fi|Bi∩B j) for all ( fi,Bi) ∈ C and B j ∈B j.
Another important feature of this definition is that B j is not only irrelevant to unconditional local
lower previsions of the form P( fi)—in the sense that P( fi) = P( fi|B j)—but also to conditional
local lower previsions such as P( fi|Bi)—in the sense that P( fi|Bi) = P( fi|Bi ∩B j). This type of
irrelevance is called h-irrelevance; see Cozman (2013) and De Bock (2015). Note, however, that this
feature is optional within our framework; it only appears when C is sufficiently large. If Bi = Xi
for all ( fi,Bi) ∈ C , our definition reduces to the simple requirement that P( fi) = P( fi|B j).
5. The Independent Natural Extension
All of that being said, we are now finally ready to introduce our central object of interest, which
is the independent natural extension. Basically, the question to which this concept provides an
answer is always the same: given two local uncertainty models and an assessment of epistemic
7
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independence, what then should be the corresponding joint model? The answer, however, depends
on the specific framework that is being considered.
Within the framework of sets of desirable gambles, the local uncertainty models are coherent
sets of desirable gambles. In particular, for each i ∈ {1,2}, we are given a coherent set of desirable
gambles Di on Xi. The aim is to combine these local models with an assessment of epistemic
independence to obtain a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X1×X2. The first requirement
on D , therefore, is that it should have D1 and D2 as its marginals, in the sense that margi(D) = Di
for all i ∈ {1,2}. The second is that D should be epistemically independent. If both requirements
are met, D is called an independent product of D1 and D2. The most conservative among these
independent products is called the independent natural extension.
Definition 14 An independent product of D1 and D2 is an epistemically independent coherent set
of desirable gambles D on X1×X2 that has D1 and D2 as its marginals.
Definition 15 The independent natural extension of D1 and D2 is the smallest independent product
of D1 and D2.
If all we know is that D is epistemically independent and has D1 and D2 as its marginal models,
then the safest choice for D—the only choice that does not require any additional assessments—is
their independent natural extension, provided of course that it exists. In order to show that it always
does, we let
D1⊗D2 := E (A1→2∪A2→1) , (8)
with
A1→2 := { f2(X2)IB1(X1) : f2 ∈D2,B1 ∈B1∪{X1}} (9)
and
A2→1 := { f1(X1)IB2(X2) : f1 ∈D1,B2 ∈B2∪{X2}} . (10)
The following result establishes that D1⊗D2 is the independent natural extension of D1 and D2.
Theorem 16 D1⊗D2 is the independent natural extension of D1 and D2.
Similar concepts can be defined for conditional lower previsions as well. In that case, the local
uncertainty models are coherent conditional lower previsions. In particular, for every i ∈ {1,2}, we
are given a coherent conditional lower prevision Pi on some freely chosen local domain Ci⊆C (Xi).
The aim is now to construct an epistemically independent coherent conditional lower prevision P
on C ⊆ C (X1×X2) that has P1 and P2 as its marginals, in the sense that P coincides with P1 and
P2 on their local domain: P( fi|Bi) = Pi( fi|Bi) for all i ∈ {1,2} and ( fi,Bi) ∈ Ci. As before, a model
that meets these criteria is then called an independent product, and the most conservative among
them is called the independent natural extension. Clearly, in order for these notions to make sense,
the global domain C must at least include the local domains C1 and C2 and must furthermore be
independent in the sense of Equation (7). The definitions and results below take this for granted.
Definition 17 An independent product of P1 and P2 is an epistemically independent coherent con-
ditional lower prevision on C that has P1 and P2 as its marginals.
Definition 18 The independent natural extension of P1 and P2 is the point-wise smallest indepen-
dent product of P1 and P2.
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Here too, if all we know is that P is epistemically independent and has P1 and P2 as its
marginal models, then the safest choice for P—the only choice that does not require any addi-
tional assessments—is the independent natural extension, provided that it exists. The following
result establishes that it does, by showing that it is a restriction of the operator P1⊗P2, defined by
(P1⊗P2)( f |B) := PD ( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X1×X2), with D = E (P1)⊗E (P2). (11)
Theorem 19 The independent natural extension of P1 and P2 is the restriction of P1⊗P2 to C .
Interestingly, as can be seen from this result, the choice of the joint domain C does not affect the
resulting independent natural extension, in the sense that any C that includes ( f ,B) will lead to the
same value of (P1⊗P2)( f |B). For that reason, we will henceforth assume without loss of generality
that C = C (X1×X2).
6. On the Choice of Conditioning Events
The fact that the existence results in the previous section are valid regardless of the choice of B1
and B2 should not be taken to mean that this choice does not affect the model. In some cases, it
most definitely does. In the remainder of this contribution, we will study the extend to which it
does, and how it affects the properties of the resulting notion of independent natural extension.
As a first observation, we note that larger sets of conditioning events correspond to stronger
assessments of epistemic independence, and therefore lead to more informative joint models. For
example, as can be seen from Equations (8)–(10), adding events to B1 and B2 leads to a larger—
more informative—set of desirable gambles D1⊗D2. Similarly, as can be seen from Equation (11),
it leads to a joint lower prevision that is higher—and therefore again more informative. There is
one important exception to this observation though, which occurs when we add conditioning events
that are a finite disjoint union of other conditioning events. In that case, the resulting notion of
independent natural extension does not change.
Proposition 20 For each i ∈ {1,2}, let B′i be a superset of Bi that consists of finite disjoint unions
of events in Bi. Replacing B1 by B
′
1 and B2 by B
′
2 then has no effect on the resulting independent
natural extension D1⊗D2 or P1⊗P2.
As a particular case of this result, it follows that if Bi is a finite partition of Xi, we can replace
it by the generated algebra—minus the empty event. As an even more particular case, if X1 and
X2 are finite, we find that epistemic value- and subset-independence lead to the same notion of
independent natural extension. For that reason, in the finite case, it does not really matter which of
these two types of epistemic independence is adopted.
In the infinite case though, the difference does matter, and the debate between epistemic value-
and subset-independence remains open. For lower previsions, Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) recently
adopted epistemic value-independence in combination with Walley-coherence. Unfortunately, they
found that the corresponding notion of independent natural extension does not always exist. They
also considered the combination of epistemic value-independence with Williams-coherence, and
argued that the resulting model was too weak. For the case of lower probabilities, Vicig (2000)
adopted epistemic subset-independence in combination with Williams-coherence, showed that the
corresponding independent natural extension always exists, and proved that it satisfies factorisation
properties. Our results so far can be regarded as a generalisation of the existence results of Vicig
(2000). As we are about to show, his factorisation results can be generalised as well.
9
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7. Factorisation and External Additivity
When X1 and X2 are finite, the independent natural extension of two lower previsions P1 and P2
is well-known to satisfy the properties of factorisation and external additivity (de Cooman et al.,
2011). Factorisation, on the one hand, states that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = P1(gP2(h)) =
{
P1(g)P2(h) if P2(h)≥ 0
P1(g)P2(h) if P2(h)≤ 0,
(12)
where g is a non-negative gamble onX1, h is a gamble onX2 and P1(g) :=−P1(−g). By symmetry,
the role of 1 and 2 can of course be reversed. External additivity, on the other hand, states that
(P1⊗P2)( f +h) = P1( f )+P2(h) (13)
where f and h are gambles on X1 and X2, respectively.
Compared to the properties that are satisfied by the joint expectation of a product measure of
two precise probability measures, these notions of factorisation and external additivity are rather
weak. For example, for a precise product measure, additivity is not ‘external’, in the sense that
f and h do not have to be defined on separate variables, nor does factorisation require g to be
non-negative. Nevertheless, even in this weaker form, these properties remain of crucial practi-
cal importance. For example, in the context of credal networks—Bayesian networks whose local
models are imprecise—they turned out to be the key to the development of efficient inference al-
gorithms; see for example de Cooman et al. (2010), De Bock and de Cooman (2014) and De Bock
(2015). Any notion of independent natural extension that aims to extend such algorithms to infinite
spaces, therefore, should preserve some suitable version of Equations (12) and (13).
The aim of this section is to study the extent to which these equations are satisfied by the notion
of independent natural extension that was developed in this paper. As we will see, the answer ends
up being surprisingly positive.
For all i ∈ {1,2}, let Pi be a coherent conditional lower prevision on Ci ⊆ C (Xi), let E i be its
natural extension to C (Xi), and let Bi be a subset of P /0(Xi). The independent natural extension
of P1 and P2 then satisfies the following three properties, the first of which implies the other two as
special cases.
Theorem 21 Let {i, j}= {1,2}. For any f ∈ G (Xi), h ∈ G (X j) and Bi-measurable g ∈ G≥0(Xi),
we then have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E i
(
f +gE j(h)
)
.
Corollary 22 (Factorisation) Let {i, j} = {1,2}. For any h ∈ G (X j) and any g ∈ G≥0(Xi) that is
Bi-measurable, we then have that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = E i
(
gE j(h)
)
=
{
E i(g)E j(h) if E j(h) ≥ 0;
E i(g)E j(h) if E j(h) ≤ 0.
Corollary 23 (External additivity) For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2), we have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +h) = E1( f )+E2(h).
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In each of these results, if the local domains C1 and C2 are sufficiently large—that is, if they include
the gambles that appear in the statement of the results—it follows from Proposition 11 that E i and
E j can be replaced by Pi and P j, respectively, and similarly for E i and Pi.
That being said, let us now go back to the question of whether or not Equations (12) and (13)
can be generalised to the case of infinite spaces. For the case of external additivity, it clearly follows
from Corollary 23 that the answer is fully positive. Furthermore, this conclusion holds regardless
of our choice for B1 and B2; they can even be empty. For factorisation, the answer does depend
on B1 and B2. If we adopt epistemic subset-independence—that is, if we choose B1 = P /0(X1)
and B2 = P /0(X2)—it follows from Corollaries 5 and 22 that the answer is again fully positive,
because P /0(Xi)-measurability then holds trivially. If B1∪{ /0} and B2∪{ /0} are sigma fields, the
answer remains fairly positive as well, because Proposition 3 then implies that it suffices for g to be
measurable in the usual, measure-theoretic sense. If we adopt epistemic value-independence—that
is, if we choose B1 = X1 and B2 = X2—it is necessary for g to be Xi-measurable, which is a
rather strong requirement that easily fails. For that reason, we think that for the case of infinite
spaces, when it comes to choosing between epistemic value- and subset-independence, the latter
should be preferred over the former.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
The main conclusion of this work is that by combining Williams-coherence with epistemic subset-
independence, we obtain a notion of independent natural extension that always exists, and that fur-
thermore satisfies factorisation and external additivity. For weaker types of epistemic independence,
including epistemic value-irrelevance, the existence result and the external additivity property re-
main valid, but factorisation then requires measurability conditions.
We foresee several lines of future research. The first, which we expect to be rather straightfor-
ward, is to extend our results from the case of two variables to that of any finite number of variables.
Next, these extended versions of our results could then be used to develop efficient algorithms for
credal networks whose variables take values in infinite spaces, by suitably adapting existing algo-
rithms for the finite case. On the more technical side, it would be useful to see whether our results
can be extended to the case of unbounded functions. Finally, for variables that take values in Eu-
clidean space, B1 and B2 could be restricted to the Lebesgue measurable events. Combined with an
assessment of continuity, we think that this could lead to the development of a notion of independent
natural extension that includes sigma additive product measures as a special case.
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Appendix A. Proofs and Additional Material
A.1 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 2
Lemma 24 Let A1 and A2 be two subsets of G (X ) such that A1 ⊆A2. Then
posi(A1)⊆ posi(A2) and E (A1)⊆ E (A2).
Proof of Lemma 24 This follows trivially from Equations (1) and (2).
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider any B ⊆ P /0(X ) such that B
∗ := B∪{ /0} is a sigma field and
fix some g ∈ G≥0(X ).
We first prove the ‘only if’ part of the statement. So assume that g is B∗-measurable in the
measure-theoretic sense (Nielsen, 1997, Definition 10.1). It then follows from (Nielsen, 1997,
Corollary 10.5) that {x ∈ X : g(x) ≥ r} ∈ B∗ = B ∪{ /0} for all r ∈ Q≥0. Therefore, it follows
from Proposition 4 that g is B-measurable in the sense of Definition 2.
We end by proving the ‘if’ part of the statement. So assume that g is B-measurable in the sense
of Definition 2. This means that there is a sequence {gn}n∈N of simple B-measurable gambles in
G≥0(X ) such that limn→+∞ sup |g−gn|= 0. Then on the one hand, since limn→+∞ sup |g−gn|= 0
implies that limn→+∞ |g(x)−gn(x)| = 0 for all x ∈X , we know that {gn}n∈N converges pointwise
to g on X . On the other hand, for any n ∈ N, we know from Definition 1 that there are c0 ∈ R≥0,
m ∈N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ci ∈R≥0 and Bi ∈B, such that g= c0+∑
m
i=1 ciIBi . Let B0 = X .
Since IX = 1, and because B
∗ is a sigma field and therefore includes X , we then find that g =
∑mi=0 ciIBi , where, for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, Bi ∈ B
∗. (Nielsen, 1997, Example 10.2) therefore implies
that gn is a B
∗-measurable function in the measure-theoretic sense. Since this is true for every
n ∈ N, and because {gn}n∈N converges pointwise to g on X , it now follows from (Nielsen, 1997,
Corollary 10.11(a)) that g is B∗-measurable in the measure-theoretic sense.
Proof of Proposition 4 Since g≥ 0 is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, there is some
α ∈Q>0 such that 0≤ g< α . Fix any n ∈ N and let gn ∈ G (X ) be defined by
gn :=
1
n
α
n−1
∑
k=1
IAk , where, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1}, Ak :=
{
x ∈X : g(x) ≥
k
n
α
}
.
For all x ∈X , we then find that
gn(x) =
kx
n
α ≤ g(x) ≤
kx+1
n
α , where we let kx :=max{k ∈ {0, . . . ,n−1} : g(x) ≥
k
n
α},
which implies that |g(x)−gn(x)| ≤ α/n. Since this is true for every x ∈ X , this allows us to infer
that sup |g−gn| ≤ α/n.
Consider now any k ∈ {1, . . . ,n− 1}. Since k/nα ∈ Q≥0, it follows from our assumptions on g
that Ak is a finite union of pairwise disjoint events in B∪{X , /0}. Therefore, there is some mk ∈N
and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}, some Bk,i ∈B∪{X , /0} such that IAk = ∑
mk
i=1 IBk,i . Since this is true for
every k ∈ {1, . . . ,n− 1}, it follows that gn = α/n∑
n−1
k=1 ∑
mk
i=1 IBk,i . Since gn is clearly non-negative,
and because IX = 1 and I /0 = 0, it now follows from Definition 1 that gn ∈ G≥0(X ) is a simple
B-measurable gamble.
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So, in summary then, for any fixed n∈N, we know that we can construct a simple B-measurable
gamble gn ∈ G≥0(X ) such that sup |g−gn| ≤ α/n. Definition 2 therefore clearly implies that g is
B-measurable.
Proof of Corollary 5 Immediate consequence of Proposition 4.
A.2 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 3
Contrary to what the length of this section of the appendix might suggest, it should be noted that
many of the results in this section are essentially well-known. Historically, most of them date back
to Williams (1975, 2007). Our versions are basically just minor variations of his results, expressed
in terms of lower previsions—instead of upper previsions—and without imposing structural con-
straints on the domain. Similar results can also be found in (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009), although
often without proof.
Lemma 25 For any A ⊆ G (X ), E (A ) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X if and only if
it satisfies D4.
Proof of Lemma 25 Since Equation (2) implies that E (A ) satisfies D1, D2 and D3, this follows
trivially from Definition 6.
Lemma 26 Let D be a coherent set of desirable gambles on X . Then E (D) = D .
Proof of Lemma 26 D is trivially a subset of E (D). The converse inclusion, that is, E (D) ⊆ D ,
is a straightforward consequence of the coherence of D .
Lemma 27 Let D be a coherent set of desirable gambles on X . If f ∈ G (X ) and f /∈ D ∪{0},
then E (D ∪{− f}) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X .
Proof of Lemma 27 Consider any f ∈ G (X ) such that f /∈ D ∪{0}. Because of Lemma 25, it
suffices to prove that E (D ∪{− f}) satisfies D4. So consider any g ∈ G (X ) such that g≤ 0. In the
remainder of this proof, we show that g /∈ E (D ∪{− f}).
Assume ex absurdo that g ∈ E (D ∪{− f}). Since D is coherent, this implies that g= λh−µ f ,
with h ∈D , λ ,µ ∈ R≥0 and λ +µ > 0. If µ = 0, then because h ∈ D , the coherence of D implies
that g = λh ∈ D , which implies that D does not satisfy D4, a contradiction. Hence, it follows that
µ > 0, which implies that f = 1/µ(λh− g). Therefore, since h ∈ D and −g ≥ 0, it follows from
the coherence of D that f = 0 (if λ = 0 and g = 0) or f ∈ D . In both cases, we contradict our
assumptions.
Proof of Proposition 9 Consider any conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ).
We start by proving the ‘only if’ part of the statement. So let us assume that P is coherent.
According to Definition 8, this implies that there is a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X
such that PD coincides with P on C . We need prove that P is real-valued and that it satisfies
Equation (4).
We begin by establishing that P is real-valued. So fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C . For all µ ∈ R such that
µ < inf f , it then follows from the coherence of D—and D1 in particular—that [ f − µ ]IB ∈ D .
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Similarly, for all µ ∈R such that µ > sup f , it follows from D4 that [ f −µ ]IB /∈D . Hence, we find
that inf f ≤ PD ( f |B)≤ sup f . Since f is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, this implies
that PD ( f |B) is real-valued, which in turn implies that P( f |B) is real-valued because PD coincides
with P on C . Since ( f ,B) ∈ C was arbitrary, this means that P is real-valued.
Next, we show that P satisfies Equation (4). Fix any n ∈ N0, choose any λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0 and
( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C , let B := ∪
n
i=0Bi and let h ∈ G (X ) be defined by
h(x) :=
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)] for all x ∈X .
We need to prove that supx∈B h(x)≥ 0. In order to do that, we start by fixing some ε > 0. Let ε0 := ε .
Since PD coincides with P on C , it then follows from Equation (3) that
g0 := [ f0−P( f0|B0)− ε0]IB0 = [ f0−PD ( f0|B0)− ε0]IB0 /∈D . (14)
Similarly, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, Equation (3) implies that there is some εi ≥ 0 such that εi ≤ ε and
gi := [ fi−P( fi|Bi)+ εi]IBi = [ fi−PD( fi|Bi)+ εi]IBi ∈D . (15)
Now let g := λ0g0−∑
n
i=1 λigi and assume ex absurdo that g ∈D . Since D is coherent and therefore
satisfies D2 and D3, it then follows from Equation (15) that
λ0g0 = g+
n
∑
i=1
λigi = g+
n
∑
i=1
λi 6=0
λigi ∈D .
If λ0 = 0, this implies that 0 ∈D , which contradicts D4. If λ0 > 0, this implies that g0 ∈D because
of D2, which contradicts Equation (14). Since both cases lead to a contradiction, we conclude that
g /∈D . Since the coherence of D implies that G>0(X )⊆D , this allows us to infer that g /∈ G>0(X ).
Since g(x) = 0 for all x ∈X \B, this implies that infx∈B g(x) ≤ 0. Hence, we find that
0≤− inf
x∈B
g(x) = sup
x∈B
−g(x) = sup
x∈B
(
h(x)+
n
∑
i=0
λiεiIBi(x)
)
≤ sup
x∈B
h(x)+ sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=0
λiεiIBi(x)
)
≤ sup
x∈B
h(x)+
n
∑
i=0
λiεi,
which implies that
sup
x∈B
h(x)≥−
n
∑
i=0
λiεi ≥−ε
n
∑
i=0
λi.
Since this is true for every ε > 0, it follows that supx∈B h(x) ≥ 0, as desired.
It remains to prove the ‘if’ part of the statement. So let us assume that P is real-valued and that
it satisfies Equation (4). We need to prove that P is coherent.
Let AP and E (P) be defined by Equation (5). We start by proving that E (P) is a coherent set of
desirable gambles on X . Fix any f ∈ E (P). We then know from Equations (1), (2) and (5) that
f =
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−µi]+
m
∑
j=n+1
λ j f j ≥
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−µi] (16)
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for some n ∈ N0 and m ∈ N such that n ≤ m, with λ1, . . . ,λm ∈ R>0, fn+1, . . . , fm ∈ G>0(X ), and
( f1,B1), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C and µ1, . . . ,µn ∈ R such that µi < P( fi|Bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. We con-
sider two cases: f ∈ G>0(X ) and f /∈ G>0(X ). If f ∈ G>0(X ), then f 6≤ 0. If f /∈ G>0(X ), then
n 6= 0. Therefore, if we let A := ∪ni=1Bi 6= /0, it follows from Equations (16) and (4) that
sup
x∈A
f (x) ≥ sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−µi]
)
= sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]+
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[P( fi|Bi)−µi]
)
≥ sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]
)
+ inf
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[P( fi|Bi)−µi]
)
≥ inf
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[P( fi|Bi)−µi]
)
≥ min
1≤i≤n
λi[P( fi|Bi)−µi]> 0,
which implies that f 6≤ 0. Hence, in both cases, we find that f 6≤ 0. Since f ∈ E (P) is arbitrary, this
implies that E (P) satisfies D4. Since E (P) := E (AP), it now follows from Lemma 25 that E (P) is
a coherent set of desirable gambles on X .
In the remainder of this proof, we will show that PE (P) coincides with P on C . Since E (P) is
a coherent set of desirable gambles on X , Definition 8 then implies that P is coherent, as desired.
So fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C . We need to prove that P( f |B) = PE (P)( f |B). However, since Equation (5)
implies that [ f −µ ]IB ∈ E (P) for all µ <P( f |B), it follows trivially from Equation (3) that P( f |B)≤
PE (P)( f |B). Therefore, it remains to prove that P( f |B)≥ PE (P)( f |B).
Consider any µ ∈ R such that [ f −µ ]IB ∈ E (P). We then know from Equations (1), (2) and (5)
that
[ f −µ ]IB =
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−µi]+
m
∑
j=n+1
λ j f j ≥
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−µi] (17)
for some n ∈ N0 and m ∈ N such that n ≤ m, with λ1, . . . ,λm ∈ R>0, fn+1, . . . , fm ∈ G>0(X ), and
( f1,B1), . . . ,( fn,Bn)∈ C and µ1, . . . ,µn ∈R such that µi < P( fi|Bi) for all i∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Therefore,
if we let A := B∪
(
∪ni=1 Bi
)
6= /0, we find that
sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[µi−P( fi|Bi)]− IB(x)[µ −P( f |B)]
)
≥ sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[µi−P( fi|Bi)]− IB(x)[µ −P( f |B)]+
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−µi]− IB(x)[ f (x)−µ ]
)
= sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]− IB(x)[ f (x)−P( f |B)]
)
≥ 0 (18)
where the first inequality follows from Equation (17) and the last inequality follows from Equa-
tion (4). Since λi > 0 and µi−P( fi|Bi)< 0, this implies that µ ≤ P( f |B). Since this true for every
µ ∈ R such that [ f −µ ]IB ∈ E (P), it follows from Equation (3) that PE (P)( f |B)≤ P( f |B).
Proof of Proposition 10 Consider any coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that PD
coincides with P on C . Since P is coherent, we know from Definition 8 that there is at least one
such set D . We start by proving that E (P)⊆D .
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Fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C and any µ < P( f |B). Since PD ( f |B) = P( f |B), we know that µ < PD ( f |B),
and therefore, it follows from Equation (3) that there is some µ∗ ∈ R such that [ f −µ∗]IB ∈D and
µ < µ∗≤PD ( f |B). Furthermore, since µ
∗> µ and B 6= /0, we also know that [µ∗−µ ]IB ∈G>0(X ),
which implies that [µ∗− µ ]IB ∈ D because of D1. Since [ f − µ
∗]IB ∈ D and [µ
∗− µ ]IB ∈ D , it
now follows from D3 that [ f − µ ]IB = [ f − µ
∗]IB + [µ
∗− µ ]IB ∈ D . Since this is true for every
( f ,B) ∈ C and µ < P( f |B), we infer that AP ⊆ D , and therefore, because of Lemmas 24 and 26,
that E (P) = E (AP)⊆ E (D) = D .
Next, since D is coherent and E (P) ⊆ D , it follows from Definition 6 that E (P) satisfies D4.
Therefore, and because E (P) = E (AP), it follows from Lemma 25 that E (P) is a coherent set of
desirable gambles on X . Hence, it remains to prove that PE (P) coincides with P on C .
Fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C . Then on the one hand, since E (P)⊆D , we have that
PE (P)( f |B)≤ PD ( f |B) = P( f |B).
On the other hand, since we know from Equation (5) that [ f − µ ]IB ∈ E (P) for all µ < P( f |B), it
follows from Equation (3) that PE (P)( f |B) ≥ P( f |B). Hence, we find that PE (P)( f |B) = P( f |B).
Since ( f ,B) ∈ C is arbitrary, this implies that PE (P) coincides with P on C .
Proposition 28 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any C ′⊆
C (X ) such that C ⊆ C ′, the restriction of E to C ′ is the pointwise smallest coherent conditional
lower prevision on C ′ that coincides with P on C .
Proof of Proposition 28 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ) and
consider any C ′ ⊆ C (X ) such that C ⊆ C ′. Then as we know from Proposition 10, E is a coherent
conditional lower on C (X ) that coincides with P on C . Since it follows trivially from Definition 8
that restricting the domain of a coherent conditional lower prevision preserves its coherence, this
implies that the restriction of E to C ′ is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ′ that coincides
with P on C . It remains to show that it is dominated by any other coherent conditional lower
prevision on C ′ that coincides with P on C .
So consider any coherent conditional lower prevision P′ on C ′ that coincides with P on C .
Because of Definition 8, this implies that there is a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such
that PD coincides with P
′ on C ′. Since this clearly implies that PD coincides with P on C , it now
follows from Proposition 10 that E (P)⊆D , which implies that E = PE (P) ≤ PD . Hence, since PD
coincides with P′ on C ′, we find that E is dominated by P′ on C ′, as desired.
Proof of Proposition 11 Immediate consequence of Proposition 28.
Proposition 29 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any two
gambles f ,g ∈ G (X ), any two events A,B ∈P /0(X ), any real number λ ∈ R and any sequence of
gambles { fn}n∈N ⊆ G (X ), whenever the involved lower and upper previsions are well-defined, we
have that
LP1: P( f |B)≥ infx∈B f (x) [boundedness]
LP2: P(λ f |B) = λP( f |B) if λ ≥ 0 [non-negative homogeneity]
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LP3: P( f +g|B)≥ P( f |B)+P(g|B) [superadditivity]
LP4: P(IB[ f −P( f |A∩B)]|A) = 0 if A∩B 6= /0 [generalised Bayes rule]
LP5: limn→∞P( fn|B) = P( f |B) if limn→∞ sup | f − fn|= 0 [uniform continuity]
LP6: P( f +λ |B) = P( f |B)+λ [constant additivity]
LP7: P( f |B)≤−P(− f |B) = P( f |B)
Proof of Proposition 29 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ) and let
E be its natural extension to C (X ). We will prove that E satisfies LP1–LP7. Since we know
from Proposition 28 that E coincides with P on C , this then implies that P satisfies LP1–LP7 on its
domain—that is, whenever the expressions are well-defined.
Since we know from Proposition 28 that E is coherent, it follows from Proposition 9 that E
is real-valued and satisfies Equation (4), which means that it satisfies the notion of Williams co-
herence that is considered in Pelessoni and Vicig (2009) and Williams (2007). It therefore fol-
lows from (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009, Theorem 2) or (Williams, 2007, (A1*)–(A4*)) that E sat-
isfies LP1–LP4. Consider now any B ∈ P /0(X ). Since the operator E(·|B) : G (X ) → R sat-
isfies LP1–LP3, it is a coherent lower prevision in the sense of Walley. Therefore, it follows
from (Walley, 1991, Section 2.6.1) that E(·|B) satisfies LP5–LP7. Since this is true for every
B ∈P /0(X ), it follows that E satisfies LP5–LP7 as well.
Proposition 30 Consider a set of events B ⊆ P /0(X ) that is closed under finite unions and let
F ⊆ G (X ) be a linear space of gambles such that IB f ∈ F and IB ∈ F for every f ∈ F and
B ∈ B. Now let C := {( f ,B) : f ∈ F ,B ∈ B}. Then a conditional lower prevision P on C is
coherent if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies LP1–LP4.
Proof of Proposition 30 If P is coherent, we know from Proposition 9 that P is real-valued and from
Proposition 29 that it satisfies LP1–LP4. So assume that P is real-valued and satisfies LP1–LP4.
We need to prove that P is coherent.
Because of Proposition 9, it suffices to show for all n ∈ N0 and all choices of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0
and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C that
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ 0,
with B := ∪ni=0Bi. So let us consider any n ∈N0, λ0, . . . ,λn ∈R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C and
let B :=∪ni=0Bi. Since B is a finite union of events in B and because B is closed under finite unions,
we know that B ∈ B. Therefore, and because F is a linear space such that IB f ∈ F and IB ∈ F
for all f ∈F and B ∈B, it now follows from (LP3) that
P(λ0IB0 [ f0−P( f0|B0)]|B)
≥ P
(
λ0IB0 [ f0−P( f0|B0)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]
∣∣∣B)+ n∑
i=1
P
(
λiIBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]
∣∣B).
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Hence, since we know from LP2 and LP4—and our assumptions on F and B—that
P
(
λiIBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]
∣∣B)= λiP(IBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]∣∣B)= 0 for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n},
it follows from LP1 that
0≥ P
(
λ0IB0 [ f0−P( f0|B0)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]
∣∣∣B)
≥ inf
x∈B
(
λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]
)
=−sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
,
as desired.
Corollary 31 A conditional lower prevision P on C (X ) is coherent if and only if it is real-valued
and satisfies LP1–LP4.
Proof of Corollary 31 Immediate consequence of Proposition 30.
Definition 32 (Conditional prevision) A conditional prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a conditional
lower prevision on C that is self-conjugate, in the sense that
(− f ,B) ∈ C and P( f |B) =−P(− f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C . (19)
Definition 33 (Conditional linear prevision) A conditional linear prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a
coherent conditional prevision on C .
Proposition 34 Let P be a conditional linear prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any two gambles
f ,g ∈ G (X ), any two events A,B ∈P /0(X ), any real number λ ∈ R and any sequence of gambles
{ fn}n∈N ⊆ G (X ), whenever the involved previsions are well-defined, we have that
P1: P( f |B)≥ infx∈B f (x) [boundedness]
P2: P(λ f |B) = λP( f |B) [homogeneity]
P3: P( f +g|B) = P( f |B)+P(g|B) [additivity]
P4: P(IB f |A) = P( f |A∩B)P(B|A) if A∩B 6= /0 [Bayes rule]
P5: limn→∞P( fn|B) = P( f |B) if limn→∞ sup | f − fn|= 0 [uniform continuity]
Proof of Proposition 34 Because of definitions 32 and 33, we know that P is a coherent condi-
tional lower prevision on C that satisfies Equation (19). Due to Proposition 29, this implies that P
satisfies LP1–LP5. P1 and P5 follow trivially from LP1 and LP5, respectively. P2 holds because
P(λ f |B) =
{
λP( f |B) if λ ≥ 0
−λP(− f |B) if λ ≤ 0
= λP( f |B)
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where the first equality follows from LP2 and the second one follows from Equation (19). P3 holds
because
P( f |B)+P(g|B)≤ P( f +g|B) =−P(− f −g|B)≤−P(− f |B)−P(−g|B) = P( f |B)+P(g|B),
where the inequalities follow from LP3 and the equalities follow from Equation (19). Finally, P4
holds because
P(IB f |A)−P( f |A∩B)P(B|A) = P(IB f |A)−P( f |A∩B)P(IB|A) = P(IB[ f −P( f |A∩B)]|A) = 0
where second equality follows from P2 and P3 and the third equality follows from LP4.
Proposition 35 Consider a set of events B ⊆ P /0(X ) that is closed under finite unions and let
F ⊆ G (X ) be a linear space of gambles such that IB f ∈ F and IB ∈ F for every f ∈ F and
B∈B. Now let C := {( f ,B) : f ∈F ,B ∈B}. Then a conditional prevision P on C is a conditional
linear prevision on C if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies P1–P4.
Proof of Proposition 35 If P is a conditional linear prevision on C , we know from Proposition 30
that P is real-valued and from Proposition 34 that it satisfies P1–P4. So assume that P is real-valued
and satisfies P1–P4. We need to prove that P is a conditional linear prevision on C .
Since P satisfies P1–P3, it clearly satisfies LP1–LP3 as well. P also satisfies LP4 because, for
all f ∈F and A,B ∈P /0(X ) such that A ∈B and /0 6= A∩B ∈B, it follows from P2–P4 that
P(IB[ f −P( f |A∩B)]|A) = P(IB f |A)−P( f |A∩B)P(IB|A) = P(IB f |A)−P( f |A∩B)P(B|A) = 0.
Since P is real-valued and satisfies LP1–LP4, and because we know from Definition 32 that P is
a conditional lower prevision on C , Proposition 30 now implies that P is coherent. Therefore, it
follows from Definition 33 that P is a conditional linear prevision on C .
Corollary 36 A conditional prevision P on C (X ) is a conditional linear prevision on C (X ) if
and only if it is real-valued and satisfies P1–P4.
Proof of Corollary 36 Immediate consequence of Proposition 35.
Lemma 37 A conditional prevision on C (X ) is a conditional linear prevision on C (X ) if and
only if it is real-valued and satisfies P1’ and P2–P4, with
P1’: P( f |B)≤ supx∈B f (x) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ).
Proof of Lemma 37 Since P is a conditional prevision and therefore satisfies Equation (19), we see
that P satisfies P1 if and only if it satisfies P1’. Therefore, the result follows from Corollary 36.
Proposition 38 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if and only if there is a
non-empty set P of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) such that
P( f |B) = inf{P( f |B) : P ∈ P} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C . (20)
The same is true if the infimum in this expression is replaced by a minimum.
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Proof of Proposition 38 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ).
We first prove the ‘only if’ part of the statement. In order to do that, we let E be the natural
extension of P to C (X ), and let E be the conditional upper prevision that corresponds to E. We
will prove that there is a non-empty set P of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) such that
E( f |B) =min{P( f |B) : P ∈ P} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (21)
Since we know from Proposition 11 that E coincides with P on C , this then clearly implies the ‘only
if’ part of the statement.
Since we know from Proposition 11 that E is coherent, it follows from Proposition 9 that E is
real-valued and satisfies Equation (4). Therefore, for all n ∈ N0 and all choices of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0
and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C (X ), if we let B := ∪
n
i=0Bi, we find that
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[(− fi(x))−E(− fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[(− f0(x))−E(− f0|B0)]
)
= sup
x∈B
(
λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−E( f0|B0)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−E( fi|Bi)]
)
≥ 0.
Since this means that E satisfies condition (A*) in Williams (2007), it now follows from (Williams,
2007, Theorem 2, Definition 2 and Proposition 6) and Lemma 37 that there is a non-empty set P of
conditional linear previsions on C (X ) such that
E( f |B) = sup{P( f |B) : P ∈ P}=max{P( f |B) : P ∈ P} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (22)
The first equality corresponds to (Williams, 2007, Theorem 2); the second equality is not stated
in (Williams, 2007, Theorem 2) itself, but follows from the end of its proof. (Williams, 2007,
Definition 2 and Proposition 6) and Lemma 37 are needed solely for the purpose of establishing that
what Williams calls a conditional prevision in (Williams, 2007, Theorem 2) is equivalent to what
we here call a conditional linear prevision on C (X ). Equation (21) now follows because, for all
( f ,B) ∈ C (X ),
E( f |B) =−E(− f |B) =−max{P(− f |B) : P ∈ P}
=−max{−P( f |B) : P ∈ P}=min{P( f |B) : P ∈ P},
where the second equality follows from Equation (22) and the third equality follows from Equa-
tion (19).
We end by proving the ‘if’ part of the statement. So assume that there is some non-empty set
P of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) that satisfies Equation (20). We will prove that P is
real-valued and that, for all n∈N0 and all choices of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn)∈C ,
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ 0, (23)
with B := ∪ni=0Bi. Proposition 9 then implies that P is coherent.
Let us first prove that P is real-valued. Fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C . For every P ∈ P, it then follows from
Proposition 34 and Lemma 37 that infx∈B ≤ P( f |B)≤ supx∈B f (x). Hence, since P is non-empty, it
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follows from Equation (20) that infx∈B ≤ P( f |B) ≤ supx∈B f (x). Since f is a gamble and therefore
by definition bounded, this implies that P( f |B) is real-valued. Since this is true for every ( f ,B)∈C ,
it follows that P is real-valued.
Finally, fix any n ∈ N0, any λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C , let B := ∪
n
i=0Bi and
consider any ε > 0. It then follows from Equation (20) that there is a conditional linear previ-
sion P ∈ P on C (X ) such that λ0P( f0|B0) ≤ λ0P( f0|B0)+ ε . Furthermore, for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
Equation (20) also implies that P( fi|Bi)≥ P( fi|Bi). Hence, we find that
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]− IB0ε
)
≥ sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
− ε ≥−ε ,
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 9 because we know from Definition 33 that P is
coherent. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain Equation (23), as desired.
A.3 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 5
A.3.1 THE SETS OF DESIRABLE GAMBLES PART
Proposition 39 D1⊗D2 is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X1×X2.
Proof of Proposition 39 Because of Lemma 25, it suffices to prove D4. So consider any f ∈
D1⊗D2 and assume ex absurdo that f ≤ 0. We will prove that this leads to a contradiction.
Since D1 and D2 are coherent, they are closed with respect to positive scaling and finite sums.
Therefore, and because f ∈ D1⊗D2 = E (A1→2∪A2→1), it follows from Equations (9) and (10)
that
f = ∑
i∈I
IB1,i(X1) f2,i(X2)+∑
j∈J
IB2, j(X2) f1, j(X1)+g, (24)
with I and J finite—possibly empty—index sets, with B1,i ∈ P /0(X1) and f2,i ∈ D2 for all i ∈ I,
with B2, j ∈ P /0(X2) and f1, j ∈ D1 for all j ∈ J, with g ≥ 0, and where g = 0 is only possible if
|I|+ |J|> 0.
Let us assume ex absurdo that |I|+ |J|= 0. Then on the one hand, since we know that g= 0 is
only possible if |I|+ |J|> 0, it follows that g 6= 0. On the other hand, |I|+ |J|= 0 also implies that
I = J = /0, and therefore, due to Equation (24), that f = g. Since g≥ 0 and f ≤ 0, this in turn implies
that g= 0, thereby contradicting the fact that g 6= 0. Hence, it follows that at least one of the two ex
absurdo assumptions that we have so far made must be wrong. If f 6≤ 0, then the proof is finished.
For that reason, in the remainder of the proof, we can assume that |I|+ |J| 6= 0, and therefore, that
|I|+ |J|> 0. The only ex absurdo assumption that still remains is that f ≤ 0.
Now let {B1,k}k∈K be the set consisting of those atoms of the algebra generated by {B1,i}i∈I that
belong to ∪i∈IB1,i and, for all k ∈ K, let f2,k := ∑i∈I : B1,k⊆B1,i f2,i. The following properties are then
easily verified. First, since I is finite, K is also finite. Secondly, |K|= 0 if and only if |I|= 0. Thirdly,
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for all k ∈ K, we have that B1,k ∈ P /0(X1) and—since D1 is coherent and therefore satisfies D3—
that f2,k ∈ D1. Fourthly, ∑k∈K IB1,k(X1) f2,k(X2) is equal to ∑i∈I IB1,i(X1) f2,i(X2). Fiftly, the events
in {B1,k}k∈K are pairwise disjoint. For this reason, without loss of generality, we can assume the
events {B1,i}i∈I in Equation (24) to be pairwise disjoint. A completely similar argument leads us to
conclude that the events {B2, j} j∈J in Equation (24) can be assumed to be pairwise disjoint, again
without loss of generality.
If {B1,i}i∈I is a partition of X1, then we let Y1 := I. Otherwise, we let Y1 := I ∪ {i
∗} and
define B1,i∗ := X1 \ ∪i∈IB1,i. Similarly, we let Y2 := J if {B2, j} j∈J is a partition of X2, and let
Y2 := J∪{ j
∗} and B1, j∗ := X2 \∪ j∈JB2, j otherwise. Next, for every i ∈ I, we let h2,i be a gamble
on Y2, defined by
h2,i(y2) := sup{ f2,i(x2) : x2 ∈ B2,y2} for all y2 ∈ Y2. (25)
Similarly, for every j ∈ J, we let h1, j be a gamble on Y1, defined by
h1, j(y1) := sup{ f1, j(x1) : x1 ∈ B1,y1} for all y1 ∈ Y1. (26)
Using these gambles on Y1 and Y2, we now construct a real-valued function h on Y1×Y2, defined
by
h(y1,y2) := ∑
i∈I
Ii(y1)h2,i(y2)+∑
j∈J
I j(y2)h1, j(y1) for all y1 ∈ Y1 and y2 ∈ Y2 (27)
This function is non-positive, in the sense that h ≤ 0. In order to prove that, let us fix any y1 ∈ Y1
and y2 ∈ Y2. It then follows from Equations (25) and (26) that
h(y1,y2) = ∑
i∈I
Ii(y1) sup
x2∈B2,y2
f2,i(x2)+∑
j∈J
I j(y2) sup
x1∈B1,y1
f1, j(x1).
Since Ii(y1) can be non-zero for at most one i ∈ I and I j(y2) can be non-zero for at most one j ∈ J,
we know that each of the two summations on the right hand side contains at most one non-zero
term. The suprema can therefore be moved outside of the summations, yielding
h(y1,y2) = sup
x1∈B1,y1
sup
x2∈B2,y2
(
∑
i∈I
Ii(y1) f2,i(x2)+∑
j∈J
I j(y2) f1, j(x1)
)
.
For the next step, we start by observing the following. For any x1 ∈ B1,y1 and any i ∈ I, since the
sets {B1,i}i∈I are pairwise disjoint, we know that x1 ∈ B1,i if and only if y1 = i, which implies that
Ii(y1) = IB1,i(x1). Similarly, for any x2 ∈ B2,y2 and any j ∈ J, since the sets {B2, j} j∈J are pairwise
disjoint, we know that x2 ∈ B2, j if and only if y2 = j, which implies that I j(y2) = IB2, j(x2). As an
immediate consequence, it follows that
h(y1,y2) = sup
x1∈B1,y1
sup
x2∈B2,y2
(
∑
i∈I
IB1,i(x1) f2,i(x2)+∑
j∈J
IB2, j(x2) f1, j(x1)
)
.
Finally, in combination with Equation (24), this implies that
h(y1,y2) = sup
x1∈B1,y1
sup
x2∈B2,y2
( f (x1,x2)−g(x1,x2))≤ 0,
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where, for the last inequality, we use the fact that f ≤ 0 and g≥ 0. Since this true for every y1 ∈ Y1
and y2 ∈ Y2, it follows that h≤ 0.
Now let A1 := {h1, j : j ∈ J} and A2 := {h2,i : i ∈ I} and assume ex absurdo that H1 := E (A1)
and H2 := E (A2) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on Y1 and Y2, respectively. We will prove
that that is impossible, by constructing a probability mass function p on X1×X2 such that the cor-
responding expectation of h is both non-positive and positive, thereby obtaining a contradiction. In
order to do that, we borrow an argument of De Cooman andMiranda (2012, Proof of Proposition 15)
that is based on a very useful lemma of them, which, in order to make this paper self-contained, is
restated here in Lemma 40.
Since H1 is a coherent set of desirable gambles on Y1, it follows from Definition 6—and D4 in
particular—that 0 /∈H1= E (A1). Therefore, and because Y1 and J—and hence alsoA1—are finite,
it follows from Lemma 40 that there is a probability mass function p1 on Y1 such that p1(y1) > 0
for all y1 ∈ Y1 and ∑y1∈Y1 p1(y1)h1, j(y1) for all j ∈ J. Using a completely analogous argument, we
also infer that there is a probability mass function p2 on Y2 such that p2(y2)> 0 for all y2 ∈ Y2 and
∑y2∈Y2 p2(y2)h2,i(y2) for all i ∈ I.
We now let p be the probability mass function on Y1 ×Y2 that is defined by p(y1,y2) :=
p1(y1)p2(y2) for all y1 ∈ Y1 and y1 ∈ Y2, and we let Ep(h) be the expectation of h with respect
to p, as defined by
Ep(h) := ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p(y1,y2)h(y1,y2) = ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p1(y1)p2(y2)h(y1,y2).
Then on the one hand, since h≤ 0, we have that Ep(h) ≤ 0. On the other hand, however, it follows
from Equation (27) that
Ep(h) = ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p1(y1)p2(y2)
(
∑
i∈I
Ii(y1)h2,i(y2)+∑
j∈J
I j(y2)h1, j(y1)
)
= ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p1(y1)p2(y2)∑
i∈I
Ii(y1)h2,i(y2)+ ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p1(y1)p2(y2)∑
j∈J
I j(y2)h1, j(y1)
= ∑
i∈I
∑
y1∈Y1
p1(y1)Ii(y1) ∑
y2∈Y2
p2(y2)h2,i(y2)+∑
j∈J
∑
y2∈Y2
p2(y2)I j(y2) ∑
y1∈Y1
p1(y1)h1, j(y1)
= ∑
i∈I
p1(i) ∑
y2∈Y2
p2(y2)h2,i(y2)+∑
j∈J
p2( j) ∑
y1∈Y1
p1(y1)h1, j(y1).
For every i ∈ I, it follows from the properties of p1 that the corresponding term in this summation
is positive. Similarly, for every j ∈ J, it follows from the properties of p2 that the corresponding
term in this summation is strictly positive. Since |I|+ |J| > 0, this implies that Ep(h) > 0, thereby
contradicting the fact that Ep(h) ≤ 0. Hence, it follows that one of the two remaining ex absurdo
assumptions is wrong. If f ≤ 0, then the proof is finished. Therefore, in the remainder of the proof,
we can assume that there is at least one i ∈ {1,2} for which Hi is incoherent. Without loss of
generality, symmetry allows us to assume that i = 1, that is, that H1 is incoherent. The only ex
absurdo assumption that still remains is that f ≤ 0.
Since H1 is incoherent, it follows from Lemma 25 that there is some h
∗ ∈H1 such that h
∗ ≤ 0.
Furthermore, since h∗ ∈ H1, Equation (2) implies that h
∗ = λg∗+∑ j∈J λ jh1, j, for some λ ∈ R≥0
and g∗ ∈ G>0(Y1) and, for all j ∈ J, some λ j ∈ R≥0, with λ +∑ j∈J λ j > 0. If λ j = 0 for all j ∈ J,
then λ > 0 and g∗ = 1/λh∗ ≤ 0, which is impossible because g∗ ∈ G>0(Y1). Therefore, we know
that there is at least one j ∈ J such that λ j > 0.
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Now let f1 := ∑ j∈J λ j f1, j and fix any x
∗
1 ∈ X1. Since the events in {B1,y1}y1∈Y1 are pairwise
disjoint, there will then be a unique y∗1 ∈ Y1 such that x
∗
1 ∈ B1,y∗1 . For this particular choice of y
∗
1, we
then find that
f1(x
∗
1) = ∑
j∈J
λ j f1, j(x
∗
1)≤ ∑
j∈J
λ j sup
x1∈B1,y∗
1
f1, j(x1) = ∑
j∈J
λ jh1, j(y
∗
1) = h
∗(y∗1)−λg
∗(y∗1)≤ 0,
where the first equality follows from Equation (26) and the second inequality follows from the fact
that h∗ ≤ 0, λ ≥ 0 and g∗ ∈ G>0(Y1). Since this is true for every x
∗
1 ∈ X1, we infer that f1 ≤ 0.
However, on the other hand, since there is at least one j ∈ J such that λ j > 0, and because f1, j ∈D1
for all j ∈ J, the coherence of D1 implies that f1 ∈ D1 and therefore, because of D4, that f1 6≤ 0.
From this contradiction, it follows that one of our ex absurdo assumptions must be false. Since the
only remaining ex absurdo assumption is that f ≤ 0, this concludes the proof.
Lemma 40 (de Cooman and Miranda, 2012, Lemma 2) Let Ω be a finite set and consider some
finite subset A of G (Ω). Then 0 /∈ E (A ) if and only if there is a probability mass function p on Ω
such that p(ω)> 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) f (ω)> 0 for all f ∈A .
Proposition 41 D1⊗D2 is an independent product of D1 and D2.
Proof of Proposition 41 For ease of notation, let D := D1⊗D2. Because of symmetry, it clearly
suffices to prove that
(∀B2 ∈B2) D1 =marg1(D) =marg1(D⌋B2),
which, since marg1(D) = marg1(D⌋X2), is equivalent to proving that, for all f1 ∈ G (X1) and
B2 ∈B2∪{X2},
f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D ⇔ f1 ∈D1.
Since f1 ∈D1 implies that f1(X1)IB2(X2)∈A2→1⊆D for all B1 ∈B2∪{X2}, the converse implica-
tion holds trivially. So consider any f1 ∈ G (X1) and B2 ∈B2∪{X2} such that f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D .
Since we know from Proposition 39 that D is coherent, this implies that f1 6= 0. It remains to prove
that f1 ∈D1.
Assume ex absurdo that f1 /∈D1. Then since f1 6= 0, D
•
1 := E (D1∪{− f1}) is a coherent set of
desirable gambles on X1 because of Lemma 27, and therefore, if we let
A
•
2→1 :=
{
f ′1(X1)IB′2(X2) : f
′
1 ∈D
•
1 ,B
′
2 ∈B2∪{X2}
}
, (28)
it follows from Proposition 39 that D•1 ⊗D2 := E (A1→2 ∪A
•
2→1) is a coherent set of desirable
gambles on X1×X2. Now on the one hand, since − f1 ∈ D
•
1 , it follows from Equation (28) that
− f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈ A
•
2→1 ⊆ D
•
1 ⊗D2. On the other hand, since D1 ⊆ D
•
1 implies that D1⊗D2 ⊆
D•1 ⊗D2, we infer from f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D that f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D
•
1 ⊗D2. Since D
•
1 ⊗D2 is coher-
ent, this implies that
0= f1(X1)IB2(X2)− f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D
•
1 ⊗D2,
which contradicts D4.
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Proof of Theorem 16 Since we know from Proposition 41 that D1⊗D2 is an independent product
of D1 and D2, it suffices to prove that any other such independent product of D1 and D2 is a superset
of D1⊗D2.
So let D be any independent product ofD1 andD2. Definition 14 then implies that D is coherent
and that A1→2∪A2→1 ⊆D . Hence, we find that
D1⊗D2 = E (A1→2∪A2→1)⊆ E (D) = D ,
where the inclusion follows from Lemma 24 and the final equality from Lemma 26.
A.3.2 THE CONDITIONAL LOWER PREVISIONS PART
Proposition 42 P1⊗P2 is a coherent conditional probability on C (X1×X2).
Proof of Proposition 42 For all i ∈ {1,2}, since Pi is a coherent conditional lower prevision on Ci,
it follows from Proposition 10 that E (Pi) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on Xi. Therefore,
Proposition 39 implies that E (P1)⊗E (P2) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X1×X2. The
result now follows from Definition 8.
Proposition 43 Consider two indexes i and j such that {i, j} = {1,2}. Then for any fi ∈ G (Xi)
and Bi ∈P /0(Xi) and any B j ∈B j, we have that
(P1⊗P2)( fi|Bi∩B j) = (P1⊗P2)( fi|Bi) = E i( fi|Bi). (29)
Proof of Proposition 43 For all i∈{1,2}, since Pi is a coherent conditional lower prevision on Ci, it
follows from Proposition 10 that E (Pi) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on Xi. Therefore, we
infer from Proposition 41 that E (P1)⊗E (P2) is an independent product of E (P1) and E (P2). For
ease of notation, we now let P :=P1⊗P2 and D := E (P1)⊗E (P2). As we know from Equation (11),
P is then equal to PD . Furthermore, since D is an independent product of E (P1) and E (P2), we
know that D is epistemically independent and that it has E (P1) and E (P2) as its marginals.
We are now ready to prove Equation (29). In order to do that, we fix any two indexes i and j
such that {i, j} = {1,2}, any fi ∈ G (Xi) and Bi ∈ P /0(Xi) and any B j ∈ B j. We start by proving
the first equality. Since D is epistemically independent, we know that
[ fi−µ ]IBi ∈D ⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈margi(D)
⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈margi(D |B j)⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBiIB j ∈D ⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi∩B j ∈D
for all µ ∈R, and therefore, we find that
P( fi|Bi) = sup
{
µ ∈ R : [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈D
}
= sup
{
µ ∈ R : [ fi−µ ]IBi∩B j ∈D
}
= P( fi|Bi∩B j).
Next, we prove the second equality of Equation (29). SinceD has E (P1) and E (P2) as its marginals,
we know that
[ fi−µ ]IBi ∈D ⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈margi(D)⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈ E (Pi)
for all µ ∈R, and therefore, we find that
P( fi|Bi) = sup
{
µ ∈ R : [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈D
}
= sup
{
µ ∈ R : [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈ E (Pi)
}
= E i( fi|Bi),
using Equation 6 to establish the last equality.
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Proposition 44 The restriction of P1⊗P2 to C is an independent product of P1 and P2.
Proof of Proposition 44 Since we know from Proposition 42 that P1⊗P2 is a coherent lower pre-
vision on C (X1×X2), it follows from Definition 8 that its restriction to C is coherent as well. Due
to Definition 17, it remains to show that this restriction of P1⊗P2 to C is epistemically independent
and that it coincides with P1 and P2 on their domain. Epistemic independence follows trivially from
Definition 13 and Proposition 43. Hence, it remains to prove that the restriction of P1⊗P2 to C
coincides with P1 and P2 on their domain, or equivalently, that
(P1⊗P2)( fi|Bi) = Pi( fi|Bi) for all i ∈ {1,2} and ( fi,Bi) ∈ Ci.
So fix any i ∈ {1,2} and ( fi,Bi) ∈ Ci. We then find that indeed, as desired,
(P1⊗P2)( fi|Bi) = E i( fi|Bi) = Pi( fi|Bi),
where the first equality follows from Proposition 43 and the second equality follows from Equa-
tion (6) and Proposition 10.
Proof of Theorem 19 Since we know from Proposition 44 that the restriction of P1⊗P2 to C is
an independent product of P1 and P2, it suffices to prove that any other such independent product of
P1 and P2 dominates P1⊗P2 on C .
So let P be any independent product of P1 and P2. Definition 17 then implies that P is an
epistemically independent coherent conditional lower prevision on C that coincides with P1 and
P2 on their domain. Let AP be the corresponding set of gambles, as defined by Equation (5), and
let D := E (P) = E (AP). We then know from Proposition 10 that D is a coherent set of desirable
gambles on X1×X2 and that PD coincides with P on C . In the remainder of this proof, we will
show that E (P1)⊗ E (P2) ⊆ D . Because of Equation (11), this clearly implies that PD ( f |B) ≥
(P1⊗P2)( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C . Since PD coincides with P on C , this implies that P dominates
P1⊗P2 on C , thereby concluding the proof.
Let D1 := E (P1) and let A2→1 be the corresponding set of gambles on X1×X2, as defined by
Equation (10). We will now prove that A2→1 ⊆ D . So consider any f1 ∈ D1 and any B2 ∈ B2∪
{X2}. We need to prove that f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D . Since f1 ∈D1 = E (P1) = posi(AP1 ∪G>0(X1)),
it follows from Equation (1) that there are n ∈ N and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, λi ∈ R>0 and gi ∈
AP1 ∪G>0(X1) such that f1 = ∑
n
i=1 λigi.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, we now let hi(X1,X2) := gi(X1)IB2(X2) ∈ G (X1 ×X2). As we will
show, this gamble hi belongs to D . We consider two cases: gi ∈ G>0(X1) and gi /∈ G>0(X1). If
gi ∈ G>0(X1), then hi ∈ G>0(X1×X2), which, since D is a coherent set of desirable gambles
on X1 ×X2, implies that hi ∈ D . If gi 6∈ G>0, then since gi ∈ AP1 ∪G>0(X1), it follows that
gi ∈AP1 , which implies that there are ( f
′
1,B1) ∈ C1 and µ < P1( f
′
1|B1) such that gi = [ f
′
1− µ ]IB1 .
Furthermore, since P coincides with P1 on its domain, we also know that P1( f
′
1|B1) = P( f
′
1|B1).
If B2 = X2, Equation (5) therefore implies that hi ∈ AP ⊆ D because IB2 = 1. If B2 6= X2, then
B2 ∈B2. Since P is epistemically independent, this implies that P( f
′
1|B1) = P( f
′
1|B1∩B2). Hence,
here too, Equation (5) implies that hi ∈AP ⊆D—because IB1∩B2 = IB1IB2 .
In summary then, we have found that hi ∈ D for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Since f1 = ∑
n
i=1 λigi, this
implies that
27
DE BOCK
f1(X1)IB2(X2) =
(
n
∑
i=1
λigi(X1)
)
IB2(X2) =
n
∑
i=1
λigi(X1)IB2(X2) =
n
∑
i=1
λihi(X1,X2) ∈D ,
where the inclusion holds because D is coherent. Since this is true for every f1 ∈ D1 and every
B2 ∈B2∪{X2}, it follows that A2→1 ⊆D . Using a completely analogous argument, it also follows
that A1→2 ⊆ D , with A1→2 defined by Equation (9) for D2 := E (P2). Hence, we find that A1→2∪
A2→1 ⊆D , and therefore, that
E (P1)⊗E (P2) = D1⊗D2 = E (A1→2∪A2→1)⊆ E (D) = D ,
where the second equality follows from Equation (8), the inclusion follows from Lemma 24, and
the last equality follows from Lemma 26.
A.4 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 6
Proof of Proposition 20 We only prove the result for D1⊗D2. The result for P1⊗P2 then follows
trivially from Equation (11).
Let D1⊗D2 be the independent natural extension that corresponds to B1 and B2, as defined by
Equations (8)–(10), and let D1⊗
′D2 be the independent natural extension that corresponds to B
′
1
and B′2, defined by
D1⊗
′
D2 := E
(
A
′
1→2∪A
′
2→1
)
,
with
A
′
1→2 :=
{
f2(X2)IB′1(X1) : f2 ∈D2,B
′
1 ∈B
′
1∪{X1}
}
and
A
′
2→1 :=
{
f1(X1)IB′2(X2) : f1 ∈D1,B
′
2 ∈B
′
2∪{X2}
}
.
Then as explained in the main text, in the paragraph that precedes Proposition 20, we have that
D1⊗D2 ⊆D1⊗
′D2. It remains to prove that D1⊗
′D2 ⊆D1⊗D2.
Fix any f2 ∈ D2 and B
′
1 ∈ B
′
1 ∪ {X1}. We will prove that f2(X2)IB′1(X1) ∈ D1 ⊗D2. If
B′1 = X1, this follows trivially from Equations (8) and (9). Otherwise, it follows from our as-
sumptions that there is some m ∈ N and, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, some B1,k ∈ B1 such that B
′
1 is
a finite disjoint union of the events {B1,k}1≤k≤m, which implies that IB′1 = ∑
m
k=1 IB1,k and there-
fore also that f2(X2)IB′1(X1) = ∑
m
k=1 f2(X2)IB1(X1). Hence, Equations (8) and (9) again imply that
f2(X2)IB′1(X1) ∈D1⊗D2. Since this is true for every f2 ∈D2 and B
′
1 ∈B
′
1∪{X1}, it follows that
A ′1→2 ⊆ D1⊗D2. Using a completely analogous argument, we also infer that A
′
2→1 ⊆ D1⊗D2.
The result now follows because A ′1→2∪A
′
2→1 ⊆D1⊗D2 implies that
D1⊗
′
D2 = E
(
A
′
1→2∪A
′
2→1
)
⊆ E (D1⊗D2) = D1⊗D2,
using Lemma 24 for the inclusion and Lemma 26 and Proposition 39 for the last equality.
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A.5 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 7
Lemma 45 For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2) and any simple B1-measurable g ∈ G≥0(X1), we
have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh)≥ E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
.
Proof of Lemma 45 Since g ∈ G≥0(X1) is a simple B-measurable gamble, we know from Defi-
nition 1 that there are c0 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ci ∈ R≥0 and Bi ∈B1, such that
g = c0+∑
n
i=1 ciIBi . Furthermore, since we know from Proposition 42 that P1⊗P2 is coherent, it
follows from Proposition 29 that P1⊗P2 satisfies LP2, LP3 and LP4. Finally, since E2 is coherent,
we know from Proposition 29 that it satisfies LP6. Therefore, we find that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = (P1⊗P2)
(
f +gE2(h)+
(
c0+
n
∑
i=1
ciIBi
)
[h−E2(h)]
)
≥ (P1⊗P2)
(
f +gE2(h)
)
+ c0(P1⊗P2)
(
h−E2(h)
)
+
n
∑
i=1
ci(P1⊗P2)
(
IBi [h−E2(h)]
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
+ c0E2
(
h−E2(h)
)
+
n
∑
i=1
ci(P1⊗P2)
(
IBi [h− (P1⊗P2)(h|Bi)]
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
+ c0
(
E2(h)−E2(h)
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
,
where the first equality follows because g = c0+∑
n
i=1 ciIBi , where the first inequality follows be-
cause P1⊗P2 satisfies LP3 and LP2, where the second equality follows from Proposition 43, and
where the third equality follows because E2 satisfies LP6 and P1⊗P2 satisfies LP4.
Lemma 46 For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2) and any simple B1-measurable g ∈ G≥0(X1), we
have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh)≤ E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
.
Proof of Lemma 46 Since E2 is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X2), we know from
Proposition 38 that there is a conditional linear prevision P2 on C (X2) such that P2(h) = E2(h) and
P2 ≥ E2. Similarly, since E1 is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X1), we know from
Proposition 38 that there is a conditional linear prevision P1 on C (X1) such that P1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
=
E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
and P1 ≥ E1.
Consider now any i∈ {1,2}. We then know from Proposition 28 that E i coincides with Pi on Ci.
Therefore, and because Pi ≥ E i, we also know that Pi dominates Pi on Ci. Due to Equation (5), this
implies that APi ⊆APi and therefore, using Lemma 24, also that E (Pi)⊆ E (Pi). Since this is true for
every i ∈ {1,2}, it follows from Equation (8) and Lemma 24 that E (P1)⊗E (P2)⊆ E (P1)⊗E (P2),
and therefore, because of Equation (11), that P1⊗P2 ≤ P1⊗P2.
The result can now be proved as follows. First, since P1⊗P2 ≤ P1⊗P2, we find that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh)≤ (P1⊗P2)( f +gh). (30)
Secondly, since we know from Proposition 42 that (P1⊗P2) is coherent, it follows from Proposi-
tion 29 that (P1⊗P2) satisfies LP7, which implies that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh)≤−(P1⊗P2)(− f −gh)≤−P1
(
− f +gP2(−h)
)
, (31)
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using Lemma 45 for the second inequality. Finally, we also know that
−P1
(
− f +gP2(−h)
)
= P1
(
f +gP2(h)
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
, (32)
where the first equality follows from Definitions 32 and 33 because P1 and P2 are conditional linear
previsions, and where the second equality follows because P2(h) = E2(h) and P1
(
f + gE2(h)
)
=
E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
. By combining Equations (30)–(32), the result is now immediate.
Proposition 47 For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2) and any simple B1-measurable g ∈ G≥0(X1),
we have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
.
Proof of Proposition 47 Immediate consequence of Lemmas 45 and 46.
Proof of Theorem 21 Since g ∈ G≥0(X1) is B1-measurable, we know from Definition 2 that
there is a sequence {gn}n∈N of simple B1-measurable gambles in G≥0(X1) such that gn converges
uniformly to g. This also implies that f +gnE2(h) converges uniformly to f +gE2(h) and, since h
is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, that f + gnh converges uniformly to f + gh. The
result now follows from the following series of equalities:
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = lim
n→+∞
(P1⊗P2)( f +gnh) = lim
n→+∞
E1
(
f +gnE2(h)
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
.
The first of these equalities holds because it follows from Propositions 42 and 29 that P1⊗P2 sat-
isfies LP5. The second equality follows from Proposition 47. The third equality holds because the
coherence of E1 allows us to infer from Proposition 29 that E1 satisfies LP5.
Proof of Corollary 22 Let f := 0 ∈ G (Xi). We then know from Theorem 21 that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = (P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E i
(
f +gE j(h)
)
= E i
(
gE j(h)
)
.
The result can now be inferred from the non-negative homogeneity—LP2—of E i that is implied
by its coherence. If E j(h) ≥ 0, we simply apply the non-negative homogeneity for λ := E j(h). If
E j(h) ≤ 0, we apply it for λ :=−E j(h) and combine this with the fact that E i(g) :=−E i(−g).
Proof of Corollary 23 Let g := 1. Then g belongs to G≥0(X1) and is B1-measurable. Therefore,
we know from Theorem 21 that
(P1⊗P2)( f +h) = (P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
= E1
(
f +E2(h)
)
.
The result now follows from the constant additivity—LP6—of E1 that is implied by its coherence.
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